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INTRODUCTION
Does Crimea now constitute a part of Russia or Ukraine? De facto, the
answer is undoubtedly Russia. As early as March 2014, Secretary of State John
Kerry conceded that Russia had "complete operational control of the Crimean
peninsula."I De jure, the answer is more complicated. Ukraine contends that
Russia unlawfully "annexed" Crimea,2 while Russia contends that Crimea
lawfully declared independence and "acceded" to Russia.3 Although most
states4 and commentators have sided with Ukraine, no international court or
t Yale Law School, J.D. 2016; Princeton University, A.B. 2011. Email:
ptzeng90@gmail.com. The author would like to thank Jayoung Jeon, Britta Redwood, Claire Kim, Ben
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1. Paul Lewis et al., US Concedes Russia Has Control of Crimea and Seeks to Contain Putin,
THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 3, 2014.
2. U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 80th plen. mtg. at 1-3, U.N. Doc. A/68/PV.80 (Mar. 27, 2014)
[hereinafter General Assembly Plenary Meeting on Ukraine].
3. Id. at 3-4.
4. On March 27, 2014, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a non-binding
resolution declaring the Crimea independence referendum invalid. Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, G.A.
Res. 68/262, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/262 (Mar. 27, 2014). The vote was 100 to 11, with 58 abstentions.
General Assembly Plenary Meeting on Ukraine, supra note 2, at 17.
5. E.g., William W. Burke-White, Crimea and the International Legal Order, in PENN LAW:
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (2014); Robin Gei8, Russia's Annexation of Crimea: The Mills of
International Law Grind Slowly but They Do Grind, 91 INT'L L. STUD. 425 (2015); Christian Maxsen,
The Crimea Crisis: An International Law Perspective, 74 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 367, 390 (2014);
Anna Stepanowa, International Law and Legality of Secession in Crimea, CAMBRIDGE J. INT'L L. &
COMP. L. (2014); Antonello Tancredi, The Russian Annexation of the Crimea: Questions Relating to the
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tribunal has yet to declare whether Crimea today constitutes Russian or
Ukrainian territory under international law. This may be about to change.
As of June 2016, Ukrainian investors have instituted at least seven
investor-state arbitrations against Russia under the Russia-Ukraine Bilateral
Investment Treaty (BIT)6 with regards to investments in Crimea. As a result, at
least seven arbitral tribunals may have the jurisdiction to determine whether
Crimea constitutes Russian or Ukrainian territory under international law.8
Nevertheless, there are strong grounds for questioning the legitimacy of the
tribunals' determinations: due to the unique structure of investor-state
arbitrations, all parties to the arbitrations-the investors and Russia-have an
interest in convincing the tribunals that Crimea is a part of Russian, not
Ukrainian, territory. Ukraine will not have a seat at the table in any of the
arbitrations, even though its interests are arguably the most at stake.
Ukraine, however, has also instituted proceedings of its own. To date,
Ukraine has filed four cases against Russia before the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR). 9 In addition, it has expressed its intention to file two
claims against Russia before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)Io as well as
a third claim against Russia before a tribunal constituted under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 1 Nevertheless, while
these judicial bodies may find that Russia has violated international law, they
would likely not have the jurisdiction to determine whether Crimea constitutes
Russian or Ukrainian territory. Therefore, if Ukraine wishes to obtain an
impartial determination of sovereignty over Crimea, it would be in need of an
alternative judicial forum.
This Comment proposes that Ukraine institute arbitral proceedings
against Russia under the often overlooked state-to-state dispute settlement
provision of the Russia-Ukraine BIT. This would give Ukraine a seat at the
table, and the tribunal-unlike the ECtHR, the ICJ, and the UNCLOS
Use of Force, 1 QUESTIONS OF INT'L L. 5 (2014); Roy Allison et al., The Ukraine Crisis: An
International Law Perspective, CHATHAM HOUSE (July 11, 2014), https://www.chathamhouse.org/event
/ukraine-crisis-intemational-law-perspective.
6. Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of
Ministers of the Ukraine on the Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments, Russ.-Ukr., Nov.
27, 1998, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2233 [hereinafter Russia-Ukraine
BIT].
7. The seven publicly known cases are Igor Kolomoisky and Aeroport Belbek LLC v. Russia,
Privatbank and Finilon v. Russia, Stabil LLC v. Russia, PJSC Ukrnafta v. Russia, Everest Estate LLC v.
Russia, Oschadbank v. Russia, and Luzgor LLC v. Russia. See Luke Eric Peterson, Russia Disputes
Round-up: Updates on Status of 11 Known Investment Treaty Claims, INVESTMENT ARB. REP., Jan. 19,
2016.
8. See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
9. Marko Milanovic, Ukraine Derogates from the ICCPR and the ECHR, Files Fourth
Interstate Application against Russia, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/ukraine
-derogates-from-the-iccpr-and-the-echr-files-fourth-interstate-application-against-russia/.
10. Julian Ku, Ukraine Prepares Even More International Lawsuits That Russia Will Ignore,
OPtNIO JURIS (Feb. 27, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/02/27/ukraine-v-russia-where-can-you-sue/;
Gaiane Nuridzhanyan, Ukraine vs. Russia in International Courts and Tribunals, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 9,
2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/ukraine-versus-russia-in-intemational-courts-and-tribunals/.
11. Julian Ku, As Ukraine Prepares to Take Russia to UNCLOS Arbitration Over Crimea, I
Predict Russia's Likely Reaction, OPIN1o JURIS (Feb. 1, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/02/01/ukraine
-prepares-to-take-russia-to-unclos-arbitration/; Nuridzhanyan, supra note 10.
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tribunal-would have the jurisdiction to determine whether Crimea constitutes
Russian or Ukrainian territory.
For the avoidance of doubt, this Comment does not opine on the question
of whether Crimea constitutes Russian or Ukrainian territory, as that question
has already been thoroughly discussed in the literature.1 2 Rather, this Comment
discusses the more practical question of how Ukraine can bring Russia before
an international court or tribunal with jurisdiction over the territorial
sovereignty dispute.
This Comment is organized as follows. Part I discusses the pending
investor-state arbitrations against Russia, explaining why the legitimacy of the
tribunals' determinations should be questioned. Part II examines the ECtHR,
ICJ, and UNCLOS proceedings, explaining why these judicial bodies would
likely not have the jurisdiction to determine whether Crimea constitutes
Russian or Ukrainian territory. And Part III proposes that Ukraine institute
state-to-state investment arbitration proceedings against Russia. The Comment
then concludes with some final thoughts.
I. THE PENDING INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATIONS
Article 9 of the Russia-Ukraine BIT grants Ukrainian investors the right
to institute arbitral proceedings against Russia for compensation if Russia
expropriates any of the investors' investments on Russian territory (and vice
versa with respect to the investments of Russian investors on Ukrainian
territory).13 Ukrainian investors have instituted at least seven such investor-
state arbitrations against Russia with regards to their investments in Crimea.14
Article 9 does not expressly give the investor-state tribunals jurisdiction
to determine who has sovereignty over Crimea. Nevertheless, as a general
matter, international courts and tribunals may sometimes make a determination
of international law as a matter of ancillary jurisdiction, that is, if such a
determination is necessary to resolve a dispute over which they have
jurisdiction.' 5 This could very well be the case here.
Article 1(1) of the BIT defines "investment" as "all kinds of property and
intellectual values, which are put in by the investor of one Contracting Party on
the territory of the other Contracting Party in conformity with the latter's
legislation."l6 As a result, in order to determine whether the Ukrainian
12. See supra note 5.
13. Russia-Ukraine BIT, supra note 6, art. 9.
14. See supra note 7.
15. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, Merits, 2015 I.C.J. Rep., ¶ 85 (Feb. 3); German Interests in Polish
Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 6, at 18 (Aug. 25); Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 2, at 28 (Aug. 30).
16. Id. art. 1(1) (emphasis added). Most BITs use similar language. States can, however,
specify the exact meaning of the word territory in their BITs. For example, Article 1(c) of the
Netherlands-Venezuela BIT provides: "the term 'territory' includes the maritime areas adjacent to the
coast of the State concerned, to the extent to which that State exercises sovereign rights or jurisdiction in
those areas according to international law." Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Neth.-Venez., Oct. 22, 1991,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2094.
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investors' investments in Crimea qualify as "investments" under the BIT, the
tribunals must determine whether Crimea constitutes a part of the "territory" of
the Russian Federation.' 7
Here's the problem: it is in the interest of the Ukrainian investors to
convince the tribunals that Crimea is Russian territory because Russia must pay
compensation for its mistreatment of investments in Crimea only if Crimea
constitutes Russian territory. At the same time, it is also in the interest of
Russia to convince the tribunals that Crimea is Russian territory because the
value of Crimea to Russia far exceeds the amount of compensation claimed by
the investors.' 8 As a result, in each of the seven arbitrations, both parties have
the incentive to convince the tribunal that Crimea constitutes Russian territory.
Moreover, each party has the right under the applicable arbitration rules to
appoint one of the three arbitrators on the tribunal,' 9 meaning that together the
two parties may appoint a majority of the tribunal.20 In light of these facts, there
is reason to question the legitimacy of the tribunals' determinations on the
question of sovereignty over Crimea. The missing voice at the table is Ukraine,
yet under the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism of the Russia-
Ukraine BIT, Ukraine does not have a right to participate in the arbitrations.
In theory, the problem could be mitigated in a few ways. First, the
tribunals could nonetheless sua sponte consider the interests of Ukraine in
determining their own jurisdiction, even if all of the parties agree and argue that
Crimea constitutes Russian territory. Second, the tribunals could allow Ukraine
to make an amicus curiae submission to the tribunal. Third, if both parties
indeed agree that Crimea constitutes a part of Russia, the tribunals could avoid
making a formal determination on the question.
Nevertheless, in practice, these avenues for mitigation are not very
satisfying. The reality is that investor-state tribunals regularly choose not to
17. The tribunals could avoid this question in a variety of ways. They could find that they do
not have jurisdiction by interpreting Article 1(1) to require that the initial investment be made in Russian
territory, by interpreting Article 1(1) to require that the initial investment be in conformity with IRussian
legislation, or by interpreting Article 9(2) to not constitute an open offer by Russia to arbitrate disputes.
They could also interpret Article 1(1) to only require that the investment be in territory under the
effective control of Russia. For the purposes of this Comment, however, it is assumed that the tribunals
will have to determine whether Crimea constitutes Russian or Ukrainian "territory."
18. Crimea's offshore natural resources alone are valued at seven billion dollars. Jason Bush,
Factbox-Costs and Benefits from Russia's Annexation of Crimea, REUTERS, Apr. 8, 2014. Although
the monetary claims of the pending investor-State arbitrations are not public, it has been reported that
Kolomoisky and Belbek Airport claim $15 million, and Privatbank and Finilon claim $200 million. See
Luke Eric Peterson, First UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal is Finalized to Hear Claim That Russia Is
Liable for Harm Befalling Investments in Annexed Crimean Peninsula, INVESTMENT ARB. REP., July 14,
2015; Luke Eric Peterson, A Second UNCITRAL Tribunal Is Constituted to Hear Crimea Claims Against
Russia, as Tribunal Selection Begins in Three Further Cases, INVESTMENT ARB. REP., July 14, 2015.
Meanwhile, Ukraine has valued Crimea at $90 billion. Leonid Bershidsky, Will Putin Pay $90 Billion
for Crimea?, BLOOMBERG VIEW, June 3, 2014.
19. Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A.
Res. 31/98, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, ch. V § C, art. 9(1), U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976).
20. Russia, however, has declared that it will not participate in at least one of the arbitrations.
Julian Ku, Is Russia's Boycott of an Arbitration Brought Under Ukraine-Russia Bilateral Investment
Treaty a Sign of a Trend?, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 11, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/01/11/russia-
boycotts-arbitration-brought-under-ukraine-russia-bilateral-investment-treaty/.
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examine their own jurisdiction if no objection is raised by a party,21 they
sometimes reject amicus curiae submissions,22 and they are usually quite
proactive in answering any legal question over which they have jurisdiction.23
Therefore, the underlying problem remains: although Ukraine has a
strong interest in the determinations of the tribunals over the legal status of
Crimea, it does not have a seat at the table.
II. THE ECTHR, ICJ, AND UNCLOS PROCEEDINGS
Ukraine has instituted proceedings against Russia before the ECtHR and
has expressed its intention to file cases against Russia before the ICJ and before
an UNCLOS tribunal. Nevertheless, these judicial bodies would likely not have
the jurisdiction to determine whether Crimea constitutes Russian or Ukrainian
territory.
A. The ECtHR Proceedings
The ECtHR may exercise jurisdiction over a dispute between two states
under Article 33 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 24
Nevertheless, the dispute must concern an "alleged breach of the provisions of
the Convention [or its] Protocols." 25 The Convention and its Protocols only
create international obligations to respect the human rights of individuals; 26
they do not prohibit states from acquiring the territory of other states.
Therefore, the ECtHR would not have jurisdiction to determine the legality of
Russia's acquisition of Crimea.
The ECtHR would also not have ancillary jurisdiction over the question
of sovereignty over Crimea. The Convention only imposes obligations on states
to respect the human rights of individuals "within [its] jurisdiction," not within
its "territory." 27 Indeed, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR makes clear that
Russia would owe human rights obligations under the Convention to
individuals in Crimea given Russia's de facto occupation of the territory,28
21. See, e.g., Mobil Oil v. N.Z., ICSID Case No. ARB/87/2, Findings on Liability,
Interpretation and Allied Issues, ¶ 2.9 (May 4, 1989); Asian Agric. Prod. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case
No. ARB/87/3, Award, In 1, 2 (June 27, 1990); Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1,
Award, ¶ 11 (Feb. 17, 2000); CDC v. Seychelles, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, Award, ¶ 6 (Dec. 17,
2003); Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/ll , Award (Oct. 12, 2005); World Duty
Free v. Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award (Oct. 4, 2006).
22. See, e.g., Bernhard Von Pezold v. Zim., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Procedural Order
No. 2 (June 26, 2012); Border Timbers v. Zim., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25, Procedural Order No. 2
(June 26, 2012); Apotex v. U.S., UNCITRAL, Procedural Order No. 2 on the Participation of Non-
Disputing Party (Oct. 11, 2011).
23. Mahnaz Malik, The Expanding Jurisdiction of Investment-State Tribunals: Lessons for
Treaty Negotiators, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAtNABLE DEV. (2007).
24. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 33, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
25. Id.
26. See id. art. 1.
27. Id.
28. See Chiragov and Others v. Armenia, App. No. 13216/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., Merits, ¶ 168
(2015) (Grand Chamber); Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, Eur. Ct. H.R., Merits, ¶ 52 (1996)
(Grand Chamber); Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R., Merits, ¶ 80 (1994) (Grand
2016] 463
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 41: 459
regardless of whether the territory is de jure a part of Russia. Therefore, the
ECtHR does not have the jurisdiction to determine whether Crimea is part of
the sovereign territory of Russia or Ukraine.
This is not to say that the ECtHR proceedings are insignificant. Ukraine
could obtain multiple rulings from the ECtHR that Russia violated its human
rights obligations under the ECHR. Nevertheless, Ukraine could not obtain a
determination that Crimea constitutes Ukrainian rather than Russian territory.
B. The ICJ Proceedings
The ICJ may exercise jurisdiction over a dispute in four principal ways:
first, the conclusion of a special agreement by both parties; second, the
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction by both parties; third, the acceptance of
jurisdiction forum prorogatum by the respondent; and fourth, the existence of a
treaty with a compromissory clause conferring jurisdiction on the ICJ.29 As
Russia has not accepted the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction, is unlikely to
conclude a special agreement with Ukraine, and is unlikely to accept the
jurisdiction of the court forum prorogatum, the only possible ground for
jurisdiction is a preexisting treaty with a compromissory clause.
Indeed, Ukraine has expressed its intention to file a claim before the ICJ
under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD),30 Article 22 of which grants the ICJ jurisdiction over
disputes with respect to the interpretation or application of the Convention.31
Nevertheless, the Convention primarily concerns racial discrimination; it does
not prohibit the acquisition of territory. And like the ECHR, the CERD only
imposes obligations on a state within its "jurisdiction," not its "territory," 32
thereby undermining prospects for ancillary jurisdiction. Therefore, the ICJ
would not have the power to determine the extent of the "territory" of Russia.
Ukraine has also expressed its intention to file a claim before the ICJ
under the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
33Terrorism (ICSFT), Article 24(1) of which grants the ICJ jurisdiction over
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention. 34 As
with the CERD, the problem remains that the ICSFT primarily concerns the
financing of terrorism; it does not prohibit the acquisition of territory.
Admittedly, there is a stronger case to be made for ancillary jurisdiction. Unlike
the ECHR and the CERD, the ICSFT not only imposes obligations on a state
Chamber).
29. Basis of the Court s Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij
.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=1&p3=2; see Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 36,
40, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
30. See supra note 10.
31. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 22,
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
32. Id. art. 3.
33. See supra note 10.
34. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism art. 24(1),
Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197.
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with regards to "legal entit[ies] located in its territory" (Article 5),35 but also
contains territorial requirements as to its applicability (Article 3).36
Nevertheless, as Ukraine's primary argument under the ICSFT appears to be
that Russia itself is financing terrorist activities against Ukraine and/or
Ukrainian nationals (be they in Crimea or elsewhere), 37 it would not be
necessary for the ICJ to determine whether Crimea constitutes Russian or
Ukrainian territory.38 So the ICJ could not invoke its ancillary jurisdiction to
make a determination of sovereignty over Crimea.
This is not to say that ICJ litigation is pointless. The court would have the
jurisdiction to determine whether Russia has breached its treaty obligations by
supporting racial discrimination and/or financing terrorism. The court,
however, would not have the competence to determine whether Crimea
constitutes Russian or Ukrainian territory.
C. The UNCLOS Proceedings
Ukraine has also expressed its intention to institute proceedings against
Russia before an Annex VII tribunal constituted under UNCLOS. 39 With
respect to this dispute, Ukraine claims, inter alia, that Russia has unlawfully
exploited mineral, energy, and fishing resources in the continental shelf and
exclusive economic zone of Crimea.4
Like the ECHR, the CERD, and the ICSFT, UNCLOS does not prohibit
the acquisition of territory. As a matter of ancillary jurisdiction, however, the
UNCLOS tribunal may be required to make a determination on whether Russia
or Ukraine has sovereignty over Crimea. As the logic goes, in order to
determine whether Russia's exploitation of the aforementioned resources is
lawful or not, the tribunal would need to determine as a preliminary matter
whether Crimea belongs to Russia or Ukraine as a matter of international law.
Nevertheless, this sort of decision may lead down a slippery slope: under this
logic, almost any sovereignty dispute concerning territory bordering water
could potentially be brought before an UNCLOS tribunal for settlement.
It is for this reason that the UNCLOS tribunal in Chagos Marine
Protected Area held that it did not have jurisdiction to make a determination on
a question of territorial sovereignty-even if technically necessary to resolve an
35. Id. art. 5 (emphasis added).
36. Id. art. 3.
37. Ukraine Intends in International Court of Justice to Prove Russia's Involvement in
Financing Terrorism - Justice Minister, INTERFAX-UKRAINE (Aug. 9, 2014),
http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/217664.html.
38. More specifically, there is no question that Russian government entities are entities located
in Russian territory, so the Article 5 requirement would not trigger ancillary jurisdiction over the Crimea
sovereignty dispute. And since the alleged terrorist activities are against Ukraine and/or Ukrainian
nationals, Ukraine could establish its jurisdiction over the alleged offences under Article 7(2), thereby
satisfying the territorial requirements as to the Convention's applicability under Article 3. This is not to
say that Ukraine could not, through a careful formulation of its arguments, somehow convince the Court
to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the territorial sovereignty dispute over Crimea. But contemplating
the details of such a possibility goes beyond the scope of this Comment.
39. See supra note I1.
40. See supra note 11.
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UNCLOS dispute-if the territorial sovereignty dispute constituted the "real
issue in the case."41 With regards to Ukraine's UNCLOS claim against Russia,
there is little doubt that the "real issue in the case" is the sovereignty dispute
over Crimea. As a result, there is a significant risk-though it is far from
certain-that the UNCLOS tribunal will decline jurisdiction, or at the very least
refuse to make a determination of sovereignty over Crimea.
III. THE PROPOSED STATE-TO-STATE ARBITRATION
Fortunately, there is a solution to the problem: Ukraine can institute
arbitral proceedings against Russia under the state-to-state dispute settlement
provision of the Russia-Ukraine BIT.
Although present in the large majority of international investment
agreements (HAs),42 state-to-state dispute settlement provisions are very rarely
invoked.43 To date, more than 3,300 IIAs have been concluded," but only four
state-to-state investment arbitrations are publicly known.45 Some commentators
view state-to-state dispute settlement provisions as a unique opportunity to
invite the contracting state parties to the table to discuss the interpretation or
application of provisions in the IIA, especially in response to changing times. 46
Nevertheless, other commentators-as best represented by Professor W.
Michael Reisman's expert opinion in Ecuador v. United States-consider their
scope ratione materiae to be very limited.47 Article 10 of the Russia-Ukraine
BIT provides in relevant part:
1. Disputes between the Contracting Parties as to the interpretation and application
of this Agreement, shall be resolved by way of negotiations.
2. In the event a dispute cannot be resolved through negotiations within six months
as of the notification in writing of the origin of a dispute, then at the request of
either Contracting Party, it shall be passed over for consideration, to the arbitration
41. Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K.), PCA Case No. 2011-03, Award, T 220
(Mar. 18, 2015) (quoting Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. France), Judgment, 1974 1.C.J. Rep. 457, ¶ 30 (Dec.
20)).
42. IlAs include not only BITs but also multilateral investment treaties (MITs). Examples of
MITs include the Energy Charter Treaty, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the China-
Japan-South Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement.
43. Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of
Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (2014); Frank
Berman, The Relevance of the Law on Diplomatic Protection in Investment Arbitration, in 2
INVESTMENT TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES 67, 72 (Federico Ortino et al. eds., 2007); Nathalie
Bemasconi-Osterwalder, State-to-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties, INT'L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 1 (2014).
44. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, International Investment
Agreements Navigator, INVESTMENT POLICy HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last
visited June 17, 2016).
45. These four cases are Ecuador v. United States, Italy v. Cuba, Peru v. Chile, and In the
Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services (Mexico v. United States). Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra
note 43, at 1. For brief summaries of the four cases, see Roberts, supra note 43, at 7-10.
46. E.g., Bemasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 43, at 20-21; Roberts, supra note 43, at 68-70.
47. Ecuador v. U.S., Case No. 2012-5, Expert Opinion with Respect to Jurisdiction of W.
Michael Reisman (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012) [hereinafter Reisman Expert Opinion]. The tribunal ultimately
did not accept Professor Reisman's approach. Jarrod Hepburn & Luke Eric Peterson, Revealed: Fuller
Details ofthe Arbitrators'Reasoning in the Still-Confidential Ecuador v. USA State-to-State BITAward,




Ukraine could invoke Article 10 to institute proceedings against Russia
over the interpretation and application of the word "territory" in Article 1(1) of
the BIT,49 in particular over whether the word "territory" with respect to Russia
extends to Crimea. Although Ukraine would first have to negotiate with Russia
for six months before instituting proceedings, it is very unlikely that either state
would concede over the course of negotiations. Therefore, Ukraine should be
able to institute the arbitral proceedings and finally obtain a seat at the table.
Russia could try to object to the jurisdiction of the tribunal by asserting
that no "dispute" exists between Russia and Ukraine, as Article 10 requires.
Although this objection may at first sound absurd, a similar objection was
raised and accepted in Ecuador v. United States.50 In that case, Ecuador sought
an interpretive agreement with the United States regarding Article 11(7) of the
Ecuador-United States-BIT, but the United States refused to respond.5 1 As a
result, Ecuador invoked the state-to-state dispute settlement provision of the
BIT, requesting that a tribunal provide an "authoritative" interpretation of
Article 11(7).52 The tribunal, however, held that no dispute existed because (1)
there were no "practical consequences" for the states; and (2) the United States
had not put itself in "positive opposition" to Ecuador's claim. 53 Commentators
have since criticized the award for its overly formalistic approach to the
definition of "dispute." 54
Nevertheless, even if one were to accept the formalistic requirements of
Ecuador v. United States, Ukraine would still be able to obtain an authoritative
interpretation of the word "territory" in Article 1(1) of the Russia-Ukraine BIT.
First, there is no doubt that there are "practical consequences": determining that
Crimea is a part of Russia not only would enable Ukrainian investors to obtain
compensation from Russia through investor-state arbitration, but would also
mean that Russia may lawfully exercise sovereignty and control over the
territory. Second, Russia has put itself in "positive opposition" to Ukraine's
claim that Crimea is de jure still a part of Ukraine. Not only did Russia's
Permanent Representative to the United Nations positively oppose Ukraine's
claim before the General Assembly,5 5 but Russia has formally accepted
48. Russia-Ukraine BIT, supra note 6, art. 10.
49. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
50. Roberts, supra note 43, at 8-9; Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 43, at 10-12; Hepburn
& Peterson, supra note 47.
51. Margie-Lys Jaime, Relying upon Parties' Interpretation in Treaty-Based Investor-State
Dispute Settlement: Filling the Gaps in International Investment Agreements, 46 GEO. J. INT'L L. 261,
298-99 (2014); Roberts, supra note 43, at 54; Hepburn & Peterson, supra note 47.
52. Ecuador v. U.S., PCA Case No. 2012-5, Request of the Rep. of Ecuador, 1 14 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 2011); see id. T 15.
53. The award is not public but Investment Arbitration Reporter has reported on the award.
See Hepburn & Peterson, supra note 47; Jarrod Hepburn & Luke Eric Peterson, US-Ecuador Inter-State
Investment Treaty Award Released to Parties; Tribunal Members Part Ways on Key Issues,
INVESTMENT ARB. REP., Oct. 30, 2012.
54. E.g., Jaime, supra note 51, at 300-01; Roberts, supra note 43, at 54-55; Clovis J. Trevino,
State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Interplay with Investor State Arbitration Under the
Same Treaty, 5 J. INT'L DiSp. SETTLEMENT 199, 203 (2013).
55. General Assembly Plenary Meeting on Ukraine, supra note 2, at 3.
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Crimea's accession to the Federation. Therefore, unlike the tribunal in
Ecuador v. United States, the tribunal in the proposed state-to-state arbitration
between Ukraine and Russia should find that it has jurisdiction.
Whether the tribunal should find on the merits that Crimea constitutes a
part of Russia or Ukraine is a separate question on which this Comment does
not opine. 57 Rather, this Comment merely argues that Ukraine has the ability to
bring the legal dispute to state-to-state arbitration, which would-unlike the
pending investor-state arbitrations-allow Ukraine to have a seat at the table.
CONCLusioN
The proposed state-to-state arbitration would by no means be a silver
bullet. Even if the tribunal finds that Russia's territory does not extend to
Crimea, the tribunal would not have the power to order retrocession, and even
if it did, Russia would very likely not comply. Moreover, it is not immediately
clear whether the investor-state tribunals would be bound by the state-to-state
tribunal's interpretation of Russia's "territory."
Nevertheless, the interpretation would still be significant: not only would
it provide an authoritative interpretation of Russia's "territory," but it would
also enable Ukraine to participate in arbitral proceedings that most directly
concern its interests in a situation where it currently does not have a seat at the
table (but Russia does). Indeed, one could go so far as to argue that state-to-
state dispute settlement provisions in IIAs today remain extremely important
because of cases just like this one, where a state should-but otherwise would
not-have a say in a dispute concerning the IIA in question.
Ukraine's institution of state-to-state proceedings against Russia would
not only further its own interests but also support the future of state-to-state
dispute settlement provisions in IIAs. The paucity of state-to-state investment
arbitrations,58 the recent Ecuador v. United States award, 59 and Professor W.
Michael Reisman's expert opinion in Ecuador v. United States cast doubt on
the continued relevance of state-to-state dispute settlement provisions in IIAs
today. Some commentators have argued for a greater role for these provisions,
but with very little case law to support their positions.61 As a result, Ukraine's
institution of state-to-state proceedings against Russia-even if Ukraine is
ultimately unsuccessful on the merits of its claim-would go a long way
toward strengthening support for state-to-state dispute settlement in investment
arbitration.
56. The Kremlin, Agreement on the Accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian
Federation (Mar. 18, 2014), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6890.
57. For commentary on this question, see supra note 5.
58. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
60. Reisman Expert Opinion, supra note 47.
61. See supra note 54.
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